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This thesis provides the detailed concepts and method-
ology required to simulate the Corps Communications Module
(CM) portion of the Air-Land Interdiction Model.
The Communications Module is a closed architecture with
rule-based decision making, network design, threat play, and
net congestion that closely simulates the environment that
U.S. Army communication systems face in supporting Corps
and selected Theater level units in Europe. Ihe common deci-
sion making thread is a Communications Generalized Value
System (CGVS) which determines current assets value rased on
past, present, and potential usage. The CGVS prcvides a
basis for quantitative and qualitative decision making that
can he studied for cause ana effect relationships by means
of audit trails.
The Communications Module analyzes Corps communications
in high resolution detail while dealing with the problems of
friendly net congestion compounded by enemy interdiction.
When operational, the Communications Module will give US
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I. MOTIVATION FCR HAYING A COMMUNICATIONS MODULE
A. PURPOSE
The purpose of this thesis is to develop the Blue Force
(BFj tactical communications network modelling methodology,
and where possible present algorithms for use in the
Air-Land Interdict icn Model (ALIM) being created at the
Naval Postgraduate School. The algorithms, hereafter called
the Communications Module (CM), facilitate the passage of
information between the comtat functional area modules teing
played in ALIM. This thesis has several objectives:
• The development of communications modelling methodology
appropriate for supporting the sparsely populated,
Echelons Above Division (EAD) area. Several of the
prominent communication subscribers in this area are
involved in the interdiction battle, and the overall
command and control of the Air-Land Battle force.
• Realistic development of the communications network
available to Blue forces, and the examination of that
network under a variety of degradations expected en the
battlefield.
• The development of a credible value system which
provides the basis for communications decision making
and resource allocation.
• The analysis of decisions that directly impact upon the
EF ability to communicate. The Decision Makers, Blue
and Red, are analyzed for type decision made, echelons
at which decisions are made, when decisions are made,




• The development of automated, closed loop algorithms
vhich can simulate the above decision making.
The ultimate purpose of the Communications Nodule is to
perform research on the conduct and results of the Air-Land
interdiction battle. Once completed, the module will be
helpful in answering the following questions, however,
actual answers to these questions are well beyond the scope
and intent of this thesis.
• What factors insure availability of communications
systems in a high intensity conflict?
• What are the weak links in a communications plan?
• Can the communications effectively support the inter-
dicters in a timely manner?
• What communications architecture works best to achieve
Elue Force (3F) Interdictor goals?
• How sensitive is BF mission accomplishment to communi-
cations availability f luctuatiohs?
B. FITTING INTO THE AIRLAND RESEARCH MODEL
Advanced technologies have had a monumental impact upon
the lethal capabilities of the U.S. Army. New collection and
fusion capabilities within the Intelligence community
enhance target acquisition; increased ranges and accuracy of
LANCE and PERSHING ground to ground missiles enhance target
destruction; vastly improved air defense missiles and target
servicing help insure the survivability of Command, Control,
Communication, Intelligence (C3I) , and logistics. A poten-
tial Achilles' heel, the common thread weaving each system
to its controller and each controller to his commander, is
communications. Every bit of information that passes between
two points passes through some form of communications
medium. Can we afford to assume that these communications
will fce available when most needed? Most previous modelling
13

efforts have either assumed total communications avail-
ability or made aggregate reductions in efficiency for some
arbitrary value cf reduced communications availability. The
ftLIH will not ignore the critical communications assets
because the model's design is a closed architecture which
simulates pertinent combat and combat support functional
areas supporting the Elue interdiction effort.
C. SCOPE
The scope of this thesis will be limited to the
geographical area occupied by the BF Corps from the division
rear houndaries through the Corps Communication Zone
(COMHZ) . Some Theater level units such as the PERSHING
Missile Brigade and appropriate C3I facilities which have a
direct impact upon the Corps interdiction effort are
discussed. Army communications is in the midst of a revolu-
tionary change from tubes to microchip technology, aDd an
equally revolutionary doctrinal change. The communications
systems architectures discussed are those being deployed
today and in the fully funded, foreseeable future according
to the Army of Excellence Doctrine and the Integrated
Tactical Communications System (INTACS) at EAD.
14

II. QVZEhLL COMMUNICATIONS MODULE CONCEPT
A. INTRODUCTION
The dictionary defines transparent as a property of an
object that allows it to transmit light energy unimpeded
through its mass [Ref. 1 ]. The goal of every communicator
is that his communications system be transparent to the
user. This means that information passing is accomplished
in real time and with no loss of content. Obviously, with
the restrictions placed upon modern battlefield communica-
tions means, transparency is wishful thinking. Near trans-
parency, however, may be possible with the electromagnetic
communications systems available within the Army.
Simply stated, the Communications Module (CM) supporting
ALIM can be thought of as a black box; it receives informa-
tion frcm cne user and delivers that information to the
destination user after a certain period of time or delay.
This delay is the cost of being only near transp arent. The
CM is concerned not with the content value of that piece of
information to either the originator or the receiver, but
with how transparent, fast and efficient, the user wants the
communication to be. As is readily apparent, the asymptotic
approach towards transparency has the deleterious effect of
pushing cost to infinity. Technological advances have
reduced tut cannot eliminate these limitations.
B. CONCEPT
Communications degradation is defined as the reduced
ability of a communications system to accomplish its
intended mission. In this module, degradation refers to the
reduced operational availability of a system that is being
15

employed in its coirtat enhancing mission. The research
model will have the option of playing communications degra-
dation at three levels of resolution. To the realist it
would seem that communications should be played all the
time. To the operations analyst, communications should be
played, but only after the architecture or processes of the
combat functional areas have been optimized. With this opti-
mized product it would then be reasonable to test the ccmtat
modules with communications play, thereby isolating short-
comings to the communications systems supporting the func-
tional ccmbat area. All communications systems supporting a
particular functional combat subscriber are refered to as
that subscriber's Communication Interconnect! vity Space.
iSvel I Resolution assumes 100% availability of communi-
cations and real time transfer of information. All database
traffic including BF traffic is loaded into the network
architecture. The output of circuit traffic loads can be
aggregated by link, node, or arena. This method will have
the effect of graphically isolating network links and nodes
that are choke points as a result of communication architec-
ture planning. This method's results are not confounded by
environmental degradation, friendly net congestion, or enemy
degradation. This method also shows the parts of the network
that have the high value distributions of transiting
traffic.
Level II is predicated on the idea of random degradation
of links and random delay times for those degraded links.
These assumptions have the effect of "shaking down" all
links and nodes of the network including those links and
nodes that are net considered as priority targets in Soviet
objectives. Level II allows the model to be played without
having to utilize the Environmental Degradation, Friendly
Net Congestion, or Bed Force Degradation Submodules. This
method is higher resolution because it delves more deeply
16

into the effects of randomly degrading links or nodes and
how the communications planners and commanders at all
echelons of communications deal with this reduced ability to
pass information. The "dealing" is decided in the Reroute
subraodule, the rerouting of information around non-
operational areas, and the Rec prosti tutio n submodule which
allocates resources to rectify the trouble in the non-
operational areas. This creates a more realistic set of
operational circumstances and therefore more reasonable
delay times.
level III plays environmental degradation, friendly net
congestion, and most probable enemy degradation efforts.
This level also allows the analysis of message flow with or
without precedence levels and preempt capability. 3y
analyzing the message vectors with their built in audit
trails, we may determine the communication network's
strengths and weaknesses. This method will closely emulate
the communications orstacles that face V Corps in the Fulda
Eowl area. (see Table I)
The Level III Resolution consists of four rule-based
decision submodules, three chance or Monte Carlo (MC) deci-
sions based upon protabilities, five processes with imbedded
decision sutmodules, and three databases. Expert player
experience is a necessity in developing these rules. The
research task focuses on the identification of the network
attrirutes, data elements, and network algorithms required
to model the diversity of systems and environmental features
of the Air-land battle.
Detailed analysis of the Communications Module centers
on the traffic load presented to the network by the BF
interdiction related functional areas. This traffic, which
makes up a very small portion of the total communications
load, is referred to as the marginal traffic. Analysis of
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to simulate all the message traffic that would flow through
every circuit and lick. The module translates the communica-
tions database into flow rates per busy hour emanating from
a particular user across an arc or link. Using Stochastics,
specifically Telephone Traffic Theory, the CM can deal with
the database by storing only the flow rates. The marginal
traffic is explicitly simulated and critical information is
maintained by means of the message vector.
The message vector is the thread of continuity running
between all decisions, processes, and databases. Once the
decision has been made to play the CM, then a message vector
must be initiated by the originating module. The originator
(0) has a requirement to pass information to the receiver
(R) . In a real world situation, the originator often uncon-
sciously determines how urgent the information is. In Iable
II the decision would lead him to select a transmission
medium which is both available to himself and the distant

end, and one which will satisfy the urgency (U) of the
information. As it flows through the CM, the message vector
accumulates the pertinent information parameters which will
eventually provide a detailed audit trail for each message
and when aggregated it will be the fundamental basis fcr
determining asset values for links, nodes, and arena. Ihe
time clock starts when the message is initiated. At the end
of the CM, the message vector outputs only the originator,
receiver, content, classification, and elapsed time (1)
.
Other parameters that are essential to the CM are the mode
(MD) , means (MN) , availabilities of primary routes (A1) , and
availabilities of secondary routes (A2) . Some parameters may
be vectors in themselves. Such vector parameters are the
modes, means, and availabilities for multi link routes.
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 trace the flow of information
through the CM at Level III Resolution. Essentially the User
to User submodule, as alluded to previously, selects the
routing between originator and receiver based upon the
Network Database. Ihe Network Database contains records on
the actual hardware network that is initially operating,
specific unit communications equipment (modes and means),
and ether technical data concerning equipment capacity,
survivability, speed cf transmission, etc. . In Figure 2.2,
the ability of the selected route to pass information is
tested probabilistically based upon route availability.
The initial availability of the route is drawn from
technical calculations and historical data. Availability can
also fce affected by equipment outages and enemy electronic
countermeasure activities . The Communications Degradat ion
submeduie evaluates enemy intentions and capabilities versus
BF ccunter-capabilities and produces a "reduced avail-
ability" link list. Interconnected with the Degradation
submodule is the Reccnstitu tio n submodule. This submodule
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static and potential value if the link was being used, and
establishes a priority for repair of damages. In ether
words, fcased upon the link's total value, the submcdule
allocates resources tc repair damage and forecasts the time
until the link is back up to acceptable availability
standards.
If the probability test, commonly referred to as a Monte
Carlo technique, replies negatively, then the message vector
goes to the R ero ute sub module where another route is
selected fcr Monte Carlo; time accumulates. The information
on which link produced a non availability is forwarded to
the Valuation of Non-cperat ional Link Process.
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Figure 2.1 Ccmnunications Module Flow Diagram
Somewhat less damaging, hut just as aggravating tc the
user, is the busy signal symbolic of net congestion. The
user could get a busy signal either from an overloaded
communications link or from an overloaded distant end user.
In either case, the criginatcr must hang up and dial again
(return to the USER tc User subincdule) or select an alterna-
tive means of ccmmucicating. The decision here is rased
upon the probability of getting a busy signal and is called
the Circuit Connect acnte Carlo (CCMC)
.
If the user connects to his distant end, the message
transit clock is stepped. The message vector goes to the
Valuation of Operational link process, ar.d finally the
message reaches the distant end.
21
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Figure 2.2 Communications Module Flow Diagram (continued)
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The value determining processes are key. They keep track
of value information which in the future will allow us to
answer our research questions. The Valuation processes eval-
uate the communications assets worth at various levels of
aggregation. Audit trails and information critical to
resolving current communication problems and plans for
future optimal systems to support the Blue Force
Interdiction (BFI) effort can te analyzed.
To review briefly, this thesis develops modelling meth-
odology and where possible presents a candidate algorithm.
Submodules cf the CM are at various levels of maturation.
Some submodules are very mature and in these cases a
detailed algorithm is presented. Other submodules are far
beyond the scope of this thesis. Areas that are of concern
to these sufmodules are highlighted and discussed in lesser
detail with a sketchy algorithm. Under no circumstances is
there an attempt to answer the research questions. The goal




III. COMMUNICATION DEGRADATION SOBHOJ)0_I;j:
A. INTRCDUCTIOH
A transparent communica tions system is one which passes
information from one subscriber to another in real time with
no loss of content. Real time transfer is possible in a
laboratory with controlled message input and output. In the
real world of the U.S. V Corps, Federal Republic of
Germany, transparency is a myth. Blue communications in the
region face three forms of degradation. These degradations
would easily thwart communications support for the interdic-
tion forces if not taken into consideration in communica-
tions planning. Definitions of functional forms of
degradation and how they effect communications are briefly
discussed below.
1 • Env iro nmental Degradation
En7iro nmental Degradation consists of two catego-
ries, natural and hardware. This form of degradation should
not be confused with the the human induced Red and Blue
Eorce Degradation discussed in later sections.
Nat ura l Degradation is the sum total of the effects
cf such occurrences as atmospheric turbulence (ionization
and stormy weather), terrain cover (trees and buildings),
background electronic interference (car ignition systems,
power lines, commercial TV and radio stations) , and poor
grounding effects (soil grades and absorption rates)
.
Hardware Degradation results from a combination of
weather extremes, both hot and cold, and humidity levels
which net only effect the operating tolerance levels of
electronic equipment but also effects their serviceable
24

lifetimes. This form of degradation also takes into consid-
eration the normal lifetime of a piece of equipment and its
mean time between failure.
Environmental Degradation may be simulated in
several ways. The simulation results, however, would be
highly suspect due to the vast number of assumptions that
would be necessary. Reliability Theory can be systemat-
ically applied to determine the Mean Time Between Failure
(MTBF) and Mean lime To Repair (MTTR) of a link.
Dichotomies exist between the assumption of independent and
identically distributed Exponential random failures and the
data that is available from operational experience. MTBF
and MTTR data is calculated by component in a laboratory,
flhen MTBF and MTTR are computed, we are actually finding the
achieved availability. This method assumes no administra-
tive, logistic, or preventive maintenance downtime. In an
operational field environment, however, a component failure
within a communication van does not necessarily mean a link
outage; in fact, the failure may not have an impact at all.
Operational data is available only on actual link
nonavailability time. The nonavailability time may be the
result of atmospherics, equipment, mutual interference,
operator headspace, power surges or a host of other
degrading causes. The actual reason for outage may never be
known, and that makes the systematic application of reli-
ability theory difficult at best. Environmental degradation
is very difficult to measure if we attempt to look at the
multitude of influencing variables individually. However,
reams ex historical data are available from previous
training exercises conducted in the V Corps region over the
last 40 years. This data spans all seasons and gives an
approximate sum total effect of the environment on link
availability. In Table III, for example, we can see that if
information is routed over a microwave system that did not
O e;

require a relay between the subscribers, then the opera-
tional availability would be 95%. Operational Availability
is defined as the probability that a system or eguipuient
will operate satisfactorily when called upon in an
operational environment.
T1BLE III
Environment Effects on link Availability in Germany











Ao= Operational Availability = (MTBM) / (MT3M+MDT)
= (operational hours) / (total hours required)
HTEM
= mear time between maintenance (scheduled or unscheduled;
BD1
=mean maintenance downtime (includes scheduled,












It is recommended that using the available mean data
for the geographical region is the best estimate. Simply
test by Monte Carlo, if nonavailability results, then the
actual outage time should be an exponential draw of mean:
(_A) = (1-.95) x 24 hours= 1.2 hours for the Microwave
System in Table HE.
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2- Egd Force Interdic t ion
EFI consists cf all attempts to either actively or
passively interfere with Blue Force transmission of informa-
tion. Active interference means the use of Electronic
Countermeasures such as jamming or destruction by fire.
Passive interference means the mutual interference cccuring
when Bed Force (RF) subscribers are attempting to transmit
on the same channel as BF users. Nuclear munitions also
have a disastrous effect upon the frequency spectrum, but
are not intended solely to degrade Blue communications. In
fact, these passive degraders often effect Red communication
as much or more than Blue, and are considered in Fed
interdiction planning.
This thesis attempts to define the parameters neces-
sary to determine the impact of various Red interdiction
efforts upon Blue communication. It is not an in depth
analysis of all facets of Red Radio Electronic Combat (EEC).
"Most probable" guesses, with credible backup sources, are
made about Soviet intentions and capabilities . Soviet
electronic interdiction and the resulting Blue degradation
are analyzable through the use of Signal Detection and
Probability of Hit aid Kill Theories. More study and detail
will be necessary to develop a detailed algorithm. The area
of passive interference is discussed from the nuclear point
of view in a somewhat deterministic manner; the problem of
mutual Elue/Red interference in the frequency spectrum,
although enormous, will not be discussed.
3 • Elue Force Net Congestion Degrad ation
IlSfr F°££e Het Congestion Degradation is discernable
in two areas, trunk congestion and terminal congestion.
These congestions result from the overloading of either
trunk or terminal systems with messages at a point in time.
27

An understanding of the causes of message delay is important
tecause system planning can usually alleviate most
congestion. Congestion is currently a resolvable problem
facing the communications staff prior to the start of the
war. It is extremely difficult to isolate, analyze, and
solve once the war has begun.
E. BID FORCE INTERDICTION DEGRADATION
1 • In t rod uc tion
This section of the thesis is not intended to be a
fully developed, mature sub module becaase the subject matter
is highly complex and can be a thesis topic in itself. The
section is critical to the credible development of the BF
communicaticns availability. Major points of interest are
discussed and a sketchy algorithm is presented in lieu of
just ignoring a vital player in the Communications Module.
Further analysis of this area is mandatory. Inherent in the
analysis of RFI are the explicit tasks of:
• Determining the Sovie t strategic and tactical priori-
ties relative to the BF communications.
• Analyzing Soviet intentioDS based upon their scientific
approach towards BF communication in a war scenario.
• Discussing both input and output parameters and how
they would satisfy the demands of other submodules of
the communication module.
• Developing a relatively simple algorithm which
considers the pertinent areas of RF interdiction and
the BF ability to counter RF interdiction. (Note:
actual capabilities are highly classified and should be





2 • Soviet S tra t ecjic and Tactical Priorities
The first task is to determine RF strategic and
tactical priorities that relate to 3F communications. A
noted Scottish scholar on Russian affairs, J.D. Douglas
states:
To the Soviet, Lenin taught that war is the continuation
of politics. Capitalism.. . should be eliminated by the
revolutionary struggle.. . under the conditions of
peaceful co-exist erce. The Soviet must be prepared for
the wars it would like to p_revent, particularly, nuclear
war. £Eef . 6 ]
Prevent is the key here. The Soviet Union emphasizes that it
must have such overwhelming superiority, that no realistic
government would ever challenge their right to survive. To
the Scviet, "Prevention" means seizing the initiative and
pre-empting in order to disrupt the enemy's surprise attack.
Should the world destabilize to the point that the Soviets
feel war is necessary to attain their ultimate goal, then
war it will be to its victorious end.
In his book, Easic Principles of Operational Art and
Tactics, Colonel D. Savkin , a noted Soviet author and Army
officer, states that nuclear weapons will be used with
suddeness and in mass throughout the 3F deployment. The
objective is to destroy armored groups, major command posts,
junctions of lines of communication, and critical rear area
objectives particularly the BF nuclear, air defense,
command, control, and communications facilities. [Ref. 5 pp
190 - 191]
Narrowing the scope of this operational strategy to
the Br Corps, and using Soviet intonations as found in open
literature, the following list (see Table IV ) of targeting
priorities emerge as sequential events during the early days
of the next war. If these targets are not destroyed
immediately, the RF will continue to execute the priority
29

list. Even partial success insures a greatly diminished 3F
capability to resist for more than a few days.
TABLE IY






Disrupt C2 of air defense 3
Destroy Patrict/Hawk Batteries 4
air-arr capability
Disrupt C2 of nuclear 1
capable units
Destroy or capture 2
nuclear units
Neutralize C3I facilities 5
Destroy junctions of 6
lines ox communications
Reserves especially armor 7
and artillery
The Soviets feel that these tactical objectives
within the EF Corps can be attained at least cost by means
of a pre-emptory cass nuclear strike followed by deep
airbcrre and armored thrusts into the BF Corps and Division
Rear Areas of operation. Their success or failure in
attaining these objectives early means winning or losing the
war. If successful, then BF political capitulation is
expected. [Ref. 6]
3 • Soviet Intentions to Interdict BF Communications
The second inherent task is to analyze Soviet inten-
tions, based on their scientific approach, towards BF commu-
nications in a combat scenario. The scientific approach to
solving military problems is ingrained into the Soviet staff
30

officer's training very early in his career. This scien-
tific approach, as it applies to our Corps battle, covers
the areas of operations research, particularly cybernetics,
modelling, and network theory.
a. Operations Research and System Analysis (CHSA)
The Soviets are heavily involved in the use of
CRSA techniques such as combat modelling and network theory.
Extensive operational and predictive modelling is used to
determine reasonable probability estimates of carrying cut
RF strategy given enemy capability and willpower. Network
theory is used to plan information, logistics, and trcop
unit flew patterns that optimally fulfill operational
requirements. Extensive unclassified literature concerning
EF communications systems is available to Soviet planners.
It is reasonable to believe that the Soviets could model BF
communications systems. Using Network theory, they could
find critical links and choke points. These critical links,
if destroyed, would severely hamper BF capabilities.
In Figure 3.1, the BF Common User Communications
Network cverlayed on a portion of the EAD Communications
Zone is depicted. If Soviet Intelligence is able to find or
predict where critical 3F control points and units are
located then a simple network analysis will tell them where
to lock for certain "signature" types of communication
equipment and where to maximize the effects of interrupting
EF communication with commando or air interdiction units.
b. Cybernetics
Fundamental to Soviet strategy is the belief
that successful combat operations depend mainly on the flex-
ibility and efficiency of the automated Troop Control
System. To expedite the solutions of problems that might be









Figure 3. 1 BF Common Oser Communications Network
necessary tc formulate computer algorithms. Computers are
currently being planned for or used to encode and decode
inf or ma tion , to evaluate effectiveness of combat methods,
and to sclve target allocation problems. They are also used
to fuse data necessary for command in decision making, to
process data related to logistics and movement, and to make
calculations related to combat readiness, specifically
correlation of fcrce determination £Ref. 7].
The Soviet considers communications as one of
the lost valuable and vulnerable portions of automated
command and control systems. It General Titov states :
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Communications is the basic means to ensure trcop
control. Loss of communications is the loss of troop
control. and the loss of troop control in tattle
invariably leads to defeat. [Ref. 3]
Lt. General Titcv
Voyenny Vestnik #7/1971
REC Doctrine establishes a requirement to jam at crit-
ical time Army - Air Force C2 and weapon sysfei commu-
nicaticns when they cannot be destroyed by fire power.
[Ref. 3]
The critical command and control assets within
the BF Corps that the Soviets deem their highest priorities
and the Soviet attack time sequence are listed in Table V .
Attack sequence is for RF air interdiction purposes. It is
safe to assume that Unconventional Warfare units already in
EF rear areas would attack all areas simultaneous to create
mass confusion and detract from effective air defense
capabilities.
^ • Det ail s of a Poten t ial RF Interdiction Module ( RFIM )
Design cf this module is obviously a thesis in
itself, and will require a much more detailed excursion into
the Scviet mindset for planning and executing Intelligence
gathering efforts than is presented here. This subsection
attempts to pinpoint the crucial "who, what, where, and
when" related to RF decisions that affect Blue
communications 1 .
The outlined RFIM, seen in Figure 3.2, examines the
RF interdiction priorities and capabilities and selectively
reduces the availability of certain 3F links. The reduced
availability links are parametrically input into the
*For more detailed information about intelligence
collecticn and fusicn see Gandy, Intelligence Collection
Management -Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, "Hcnlerey,





Bed Force C2 Targeting Priority List
Attack Seq uence Targeting List Priority
1 Automated Sir Defense C2 2
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Automated Fire Planning/ 12
Eesource allocation for
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communication jTACFIRE
3 Semi-au tcmated intelligence 3
collection and fusion by ASAS
All Source Analysis System






Communicaticn Network database where updating of link sta'tus
takes place. The KFIfl list also goes to the Eeconstitution
Submodule and to the Son-op erational Valuation Process.
The Soviets intend to inflict grievous destruction
upon C3 systems using Unconventional Warfare and Radio
Electronic Combat pricr to and during all phases of the next
war. The Soviets define these terms as follows:
a. Unconventional Warfare (UW)
The UW forces conduct reconnaissance, espionage,
sabotage, assassination, and interdiction of lines of commu-
nications. UW is designed to weaken military capabilities
of target country and support follow on conventional mili-
tary operations. The Soviets have several hundred thousand





































Figure 3.2 Outline of Bed Force Interdiction Module
b. Radio Electronic Combat (HEC)
The purpose of EEC is to limit, delay, or
nullify the enemy's use of his command and control systeES,
while protecting Soviet systems by electronic counter-
countermeasures. The aim of ESC is to disrupt the enemy's
critical time phasing to the extent that perishable informa-
tion (on which decisions and orders are based) is obsolete.
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Figure 3.3 EEC Planning Cycle
A typical Radio Electronic Combat scenario may
go something like this. A must assumption is that EF gcals,
objectives, and priorities are satisfied by attacking the 3F
air defense (AD) C3 facilities at Corps Level. The Soviet
planners would set out to develop a plan to allocate intel-
ligence gathering assets and then destructive assets to
degrade the Hawk/Patriot missile systems* C3. Map reconnais-
sance, human intelligence, electronic intelligence and
signal intelligence are used to establish location cf AD
targets. Ccmmunicaticns emitters are more difficult to find
than radars. If radar is found, then communication emitters
must be nearby. A£ communication emitters are easy to
interdict if a location and approximate frequency is kncwn.
If and when a target is found, it is jammed,
deceived, or destroyed. BF communications in the AD arena
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are jam resistant. They have low susceptibility tc ground
direction finding. They are secure to prevent deception.
They are highly redundant both in equipment and in transmis-
sion path to prevent catastrophic loss of information.
Since standoff jamming and deception efforts would probably
be less than successful, the RF planners devise a plan to
attack AD with unconventional warfare teams and ground
attack aircraft.
At a planned point in time (usually at the start
of hostilities) unconventional warfare teams, already behind
BF lines, attempt to jam AE "Air Battle Control" nets. EW
equipped aircraft attempt to blind the radars. Ground attack
aircraft then attack isolated AD targets.
BF communications controllers assess communica-
tion's degradation and allocate backup nets and equipment to
overcome degradation or non-available links both in the real
world and in the model.
If we examine each process within the degrada-
tion scenario, we can see many explicit and implicit deci-
sions that must be modelled on both sides. Table VI lists a
few of the decisions made over the course of planning and
executing the war from the Soviet point of view and then the
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Figure 3.4 depicts the BF Corps Area under UW
and EEC attack. The shaded zones near the line cf contact
(FEBA) depict the best military judgement probabilities of
radio-electronic intercept, direction finding (OF), and
jamming usage. The softer underbelly areas in the Division
and Corps rear areas depict the employment of GRU, SfEZNEIS,
and airtorne ccmmandoes whose specific mission is to
maximize disruption in the rear area, seize or destroy
nuclear ammo and delivery systems, destroy air defense
systems and associated command, control, and communications
facilities. The ability to penetrate forward defenses is not
an issue, however, assuming penetration, the probability of
mission success is an issue. Mission success depends upon
commando search and detection capability and the ability of
the EF electronic counter-counter measures to cask EM
emissions and exploit anti-jam techniques.
c. The Nuclear Question
A mass nuclear attack upon key installations in
the Ccrps and Division Rear Areas would temporarily blind
all but the most hardened of communications systems as a
result of the Electro-Magnetic Pulse (BMP) . The ability of
communication links to be restored depends upon classified
technical parameters of each system, the distance from
ground zero, and the atmospheric conditions. (The character-
istics can be input as parameters and obtained by table
lookup for the module.) A nuclear air burst at 50 KM height
can knock cut communications in an entire theater for a
period cf time. It is pointed out that this would effect
both EF and RF communications and would most likely cccur at
the beginning of the war. This tactic maximizes the effec-
tiveness of the side that has done the best planning and
needs nothing more than non-electronic signals to execute
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Figure 3.4 RF ECM Interdiction Zones
handled the. same as any other attack except that the prob-
ability of reduced availability for most links would be near
one. After a period of time, links regain availability
levels dependent upon their distance from the burst. Quickly
following this mass strike are armored assaults and airhorne
insertions. After this, the most likely interdiction are by
ECM trained commandoes and manned or unmanned jaimers
remotely emplaced in the rear area.
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C. E10E F05CE NETWOBK COHGESTION AND DEGRADATION
1 • Int rod uction
The purpose cf this section is to determine the
probability of messages being delayed 2 and the Expected Tine
cf Delay for Blue comnunica tions traffic and network archi-
tecture. This submcdule has been developed in detail and
has reached the "stand alone" level of maturity as far as
the algorithm is concerned.
Throughout this section, analysis will be made of
the multichannel systems and terminal equipment supporting a
Tactical Command Post (see Figure 3.5) to determine the
cause and effects of trunk congestion and terminal equipment
congestion. Trunk congestion refers to the overloading of
circuits that flow over the links between nodes. The busy
signal one receives after dialing only the area code or
prefix of a telephone number is called a trunk busy signal
and is ar example of trunk congestion. On the other hand,
terminal congestio n is caused by having too few telephone
instruments available to meet a given trunk demand and is
indicated by a busy signal received after dialing all the
numbers including the last four. The hardware layout
depicted in Figure 3.5 is similar for ail communications
architecture variations. Analogous situations occur in the
use of single channel net radios. The busy signal here is
not a nagging phone tusy tone, but the operator is keenly
aware that someone is transmitting; his net is busy because
his radio receiver is "seized" by the current user and he
cannot transmit effectively. He must wait for his frequency
to clear to transmit, just as the telephone subscriber must
wait for a circuit tc become free.
2 A fairly good measure of effectiveness of a service is
provided by the protability that an arriving customer will
not be given immediate service. This probability is called
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Figure 3.5 Tactical Command Post Layout
2 - Message Tr a f fic Pat abase
This portion cf the module (see Figure 2. 1) requires
a communications requirements database to be loaded into the
network architecture to provide the "all other" traffic
which the Blue Interdiction Force communications must
compete with for electronic paths. The only database
currently available is the Communications Support
Requirements (COilSR) Database.
The COHSR Database is a file of communications need-
lines owned by the US Army Signal School, Ft. Gordon,
Georgia, and stored at the Data Processing Field Office,
Fort leavenworth, Kansas. The database was originally huilt
using the Delphi techniques at the TRADOC Branch Schools,
but has fallen into a state of disrepair and disfavor
because it has not been updated and revalidated in recent
years. However, CCMSR possesses the only past validated
communications needlines and data elements in the Army. Near
term requirements call for revamping and updating of the
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original COMSR, protably using the data elements and proce-
dures developed during the Eattlefield Communications Review
en Data Distribution. 3 (see Table VIII) The new database
will te updated using Delphi techniques. Simplifications
and a reduced number of data elements will hopefully
encourage the Branch Schools to regularly update their
communications needlines in order to keep the database
viable. The data elements discussed below are the most prob-
able and closely resemble the data elements that are
discussed in the Message Vector section. The Communications
Module crly needs the approximate load over each circuit to
give a good "ball park" estimate of the probability of
blocking and the average delay time.
Cnce the entire COMSR, to include voice, record
traffic, and data modes is updated a valuable database for
ALIM will exist. Notice elements six and seven, these
elements depict a type of price tag or value for each
message. The values are actually determined by the TRADGC
Eranch School in conduction with the Combined Arms Center on
a message by message comparative basis.*
3 Perguson, Michael., GS 13, USASIGS, Ft. Gordon, Ga. ,
Teleccn z8 March 84, with author.
For more information see CGVS Dynamic Value
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Tafcle IX depicts the CCMSR Bubble Sort program for a
typical Tactical Command Post. It is the responsibility of
the Pouting Submodule to initially select the routes over
which all COMSR traffic flows. For instance, the heavy
voice and data load between the Tac C? and Main (see
Appendix D) will be routed primarily via the multichannel
LOS VHF system connecting the two nodes.
TABLE IX
COflSH Needlines: Tac CP to Other Users
ACS ADA Bn CORPS AirCR CE«I 3n
CTICAL CP
CORPS ArmCS
Sig x3n 3DE Main SUPCOH flCAIR C?
The COMSR database has files which give the para-
metric details of all traffic passing through, between, or
within nodes and subscribers, respectively. These parameters
are necessary to match with the Routing Submodule
parameters. A few file definitions are in order:
Typical Unit Number (TUN) File: A file used in
conjunction with a CCMSR database. Its primary function is
to provided a convenient index for all unique, Table of
Organization, and Equipment (TC&S) specific units.
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SPEC. . . Specific Unit F ile: A file used in conjunc-
tion with the COMSR database which organizes the units
contained in a database into a desired force structure.
Inter Unit CCFSR File ; A communications requirement
(file) to pass information between two or more individuals,
assigned to different TOE units, and not in immediate prox-
imity to each other which must be satisfied to accomplish
assigned mission.
Intra unit CCMSR File: A communications requirement
(file) tc transfer between two individuals, assigned to the
same TOE unit, and not in the immediate proximity to each
other, which must be satisfied to accomplish assigned
functions. [Ref. 19]
3 • Genera l Sche me of Deration
The Database is loaded into the Routing Sutmodule.
The Routing Submcdule then provides:
1. Communications traffic requirements between signal
centers (nodes) prior tc routing.
2. Traffic summaries along links between nodes after
routing.
3. Local and long distance distribution of communica-
tions traffic.
Cnce the traffic has been routed, arrival rates and
service rates during the worst case "busy" hour can be
determined for each circuit. The parameters needed to deter-
mine blocking probability and expected delay time are the
arrival rate, service rate, type queue service, and, if more
than cne communication node is involved, a list of sequen-
tial queues (nodal switchboards) . Given the blocking prob-
ability for the EFI traffic that is being explicitly
modelled, Monte Carle methods can determine if the message
will be blocked. If the message is blocked, then add the
delay time to the message vectors elapsed time clock
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parameter. The message vector is then forwarded to the next
queue where blocking probability and delay time are
determined.
Incidently, the Army currently owns SIMCE or
Simulation Com munication Electronics Model, a computer tased
simulator model designed to simulate military communications
architecture using CCMSE. However, SIMCE requires manually
inputting all routing procedures 5 for each message, is
inflexible to changes in network design, and has not been
used successfully in ten years.
4 . Analytics
Restated in mere familiar terms, the critical ques-
tions that need to be addressed by this submodule are:
1. What is the probability that a communications user
will find all channels busy?
2. !-?hat is the average delay time experienced if user
finds all channels busy?
A major premise of this thesis is that it is futile to
attempt to explicitly and exactly simulate communications
flow through the Amy Tactical Communications System with
its three generations of electronic componentry and the
equally variable future communications architecture as
descrired by the Integrated Tactical Communications System
1976 ,1979, 1981, 1984, and future revisions. By examining
the processes of the communication traffic, we can apply
Telephone Traffic Theory. (TTT) in order to obtain an approx-
imate answer to our questions at a great savings of manpower
and computer processing time. If the communication module is
built in this manner, then it will be possible to
parametrically input whatever technical specifications,
s Eiscussion of a simpler, more responsive routing proce-




equipments, or architectures that are being analyzed by
simply varying the channel capacity, routing, speed of
transmission, load, etc. , that effect the arrival and
service rates. Petr Beckmann, a noted TTT specialist,
feels :
The facilities needed to realize a telephone conversa-
tion between two subscribers of a network, are exceed-
ingly complex. One of the pleasant aspects of Telephone
Traffic Theory is the fact that one need not excessively
concern himself with these complexities in detail. (Most
equipment) ... function and details of operation
irrelevant to traffic theory. [Ref. 10]
5- Overview Of Conges t ion Algorithm
Messages are assumed to have Poisson arrival and
Exponential service times. These assumptions are validated
in numerous studies of telephone traffic data and do not
present a controversial issue to communications experts.
In a communications network every nodal switchboard
acts as a separate gueue. The traffic flowing through the
links stops at each ensuing switchboard (even if for only a
micro second). In Figure 3.5, when the G3 picks up his
phone, he may or may not receive a dial tone from the switch
at the TAC CP . The switchboard represents a type of queue
called a terminal queue. Assuming he gets a dial tone, he
dials his first four prefix numbers. He may or may not
receive a busy signal from the Command Node switchboard.
This switch represents a queuing process called a network
trunk queue. This process goes on for as many switchboards
as are transitted. Ctviously, the more nodal switchboards
transitted, the higher the probability of being blocked, and
the longer the expected delay time. This process is intui-




There are two basic types of switching service
facilities as shown in Figure 3.6 . In both, subscrirers are
assumed to call at random times and thus occupy cne of the
available service channels. If the call arrives at a time
when all the lines are busy, the subsequent treatment
depends en the type cf service system for that circuit. If
these calls are turned away (e.g. a busy signal) the system
is called a loss system because it loses all memory of calls
arriving at times when all the channels (see Figure 3.6 A)
are busy. Cn the other hand, calls arriving when all the
channels are busy may form a queue and wait until service
becomes available upon successful completion of service in
the channels. This cccurs for telephone devices that hold
blocked calls. Such systems are called delay, systems. If
the number of customers in a holding ^ueue is limited (e.g.
based upon storage capacity or number of automatic rercut
tries), the result is called a combined loss and delay
system.
The behavior of any queuing service systei is
derived from the utilization factor or traffic intensity
(denoted P ) , which is the call rate (denoted A ) divided by
the service rate (denoted fj. ) . The load, a basic concept of
traffic, is the product cf the call rate and the mean
holding time. Although the load is obviously a dimensicn-
less quantity, the lead is measured in units called F5
L
ANGS .
For example, a certain type of telephone line that handles
50 calls per hour with a mean duration cf 3 minutes (1/20 of
an hour), has an equipment load of 50x(1/20) = {_fi_) =2.5
Erlanas. 6
6 One of the classic results in the study of telephone
traffic is the formula for delay given by Danish engineer
A.K. Erlang in 1917. This is for a random call input to a
fully accessible simple trunk group with the holding time
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Figure 3.6 Type Service Facilities
TABLE X
Service Available to Subscribers
l ess S yste ms
Routine Calls over S/C
Net Radio
Routine Telephone Calls
over Common user System
Delay. Syste ms
Higher Precedence Calls
over S/C Net Radio
Higher Precedence Calls
over Common User Systei






EF network congestion is a critical part of the
level III high resolution methodology. In this submcdule we
learn just how grievously the environmental degradation,
enemy interdiction, and friendly communication loads effect
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Figure 3.7 Network Congestion Algorithm
As seen in Figure 2.2, the non-operational links
resulting from either environmental degradation cr enemy
interdiction are input into a N on- Operational Record in the
Network Database. If enemy interdiction causes catastrophic
communication dearadation within an area then the

Operational Netw<2£JS Becord is updated. A massive change to
the Cperaticnal Network would trigger a need for a complete
review of how the Routing Subnodule loads the network (i.e.
a complete run of the ROUTE Sutmodule again). If minor non-
availabilities occur, then the Reroute Process informs the
Non-Operational record. This results in the message tran-
sitting the first alternate route, which is already stored
in the message vectcr. The Reroute Submodule then informs
the Leaded Network Record and the arrival rates of the dewn
link are added to the alternate routes using the same
decomposition technigue that is discussed later in Figure
3.9.
The arrival and the service rates can be maintained
as either aggregate cr as individual rates by precedence. As
seen in Figure 3.7, if we desire a lower level of resolution
(aggregated across precedence levels) then the link's aggre-
gate arrival and service rate is used and Blocking prob-
ability is determined by the Erianq B (Loss Service)
algorithm or by Erlang C (Held Service) algorithm. Delay
times would then be computed. Lower levels of resolution
would be helpful in analyzing architectural planning
problems.
If a higher resolution is required then the
Recursive equations (see Table XIII) would be used with the
arrival and service rates by precedence being forwarded from
the Leaded Network Record. Both the lower and higher reso-
lution procedures output a probability of delay and an
expected delay time. This information becomes parameters of
the message vectcr. Higher levels of resolution are helpful




6 . The ore tical Justification for Traffic Analytics
a. Simulating Loss Service Facilities in Army
switches
Our G3 (see Figure 3.5) has selected the voice
telephone means of communicating with a Brigade S3 for a
routine call. This action puts him into the circuit switch
system which utilizes the Loss service discipline. In the
case of telephone calls, the customer arrivals are given as
call initiations; the service channels are the available
circuits, and the service times are the holding or call
duration times. No gueues as such exist since Army circuit
switching facilities have no provisions for holding calls
that cannot be immediately connected. These calls are
cleared in cne of twc ways: they are either rejected by a
busy signal, cr returned to the previous switch for
rerouting. In either case, the calls are lost to the
facility being negotiated [Eef. 10].
In TIT, the SKLANG B formula gives the prob-
ability that k cut cf c parallel service channels are busy
given the utilization factor or offered load. The prob-
ability that all c channels are busy and that, therefore, an
offered call will be lost is seen in Equation 3. 1 . A short




P = c k (3
* 1)




Determination of Erlaag B Values
TAPE 5 = INPUT, TAPE « = OUTPUT
REAL LOAD. LNilN, LXiAX. LSTEP
INTEGER C, CMIN, CMAX. CSTFP
DIMENSION FCTRL( insert CMAX or greater)
MMAX = LMAX/LSTEP
MMIN = LM1N/LSTEP
DO 60 M = MMIN, MMAX
AM = M
READ (5, 10) LM1N.LMAX,LSTEP,CMIN,CMAX,CSTEP .LOAD = AM*LSTEP
10 FORMAT* ) SUM - 1.
FCTRL(1)= 1.
DO 20 J = 2, CMAX
RJ = J
20 FCTRL(J) = RJ*FCTRL(J - 1)
DO 60 C = CMIN. CMAX. CSTEP
WRITE (6. 30) C
30 FORMAT! include desired headings here)
TERM = (LQAD**K)/FCTRL(K)
40 SUM = SUM + TERM
45 PL = TERM/ SUM





r. Simulating Held Service Facilities in Army
Switches
Our G3 has selected the computer terminal to
send electronic message traffic to the Brigade S3. This
action puts him into the Store and Forward Message Switch
System that utilizes Elocked Calls Held service discipline.
The calls that do not find an idle facility are
blocked, tut are held and delayed in order to be connected
when a path becomes available. In the simplest case, calls
are held ky a human telephone operator or a memory device.
The switch holds the originator's line or promises to call
tack when a free line is available. The subscriber who, on
being blocked by an automatic facility, rediais his call at
frequent intervals until his call is connected, in effect,




[Eef- 10]- The G3 uses a type of Held service if he chair-
dials until he gets an available circuit. Chain dialling is
a reasonable assumption especially if the call is cf a
higher level of urgency (as all marginal traffic will be)
and the message must get through to the distant end.
For telephone, data, or teletype traffic, the
service held queue can be described by the Erlang C formula.
For large Lumbers of calls the probability of blocking is
equal to the probability of delay, in ether words the prob-
ability that all channels are busy equals the ratio of
delayed to offered calls in Equation 3.2 . A short Fortran







C ./ p\U p*p+^-zm
(3.2)
C=*fcBUSY CHANNELS K = ±£T0TAL CHANNELS
If we are looking for a way to find the delay
times for each precedence level we may use the following
concepts.
"7
• High R es clu t ion Can did at e
a. Precedence Level, Preemptive Resume Queue
Introducing a priority structure into a message
set influences the expected value of the time that each
precedence group spends in the queue. Intuitively it is
clear that a priority system would allow higher precedence
messages to pass faster than a non-priority discipline and
conversely lower precedence messages pass slower than in a




Determination of Erlang C Values
LINES 1-40 FROM TABLE XX
40 DIMENSION F( insert C2 or greater)
50 READ LI. L2, L3. CI. C2, C3
60 LET F(l) = I
70 FOR J = 2 TO C2
80 LET F(J) = J*FU - I)
90 NEXT J
100 FOR C = CI TO C2 STEP C3
110 PRINT "C = " C
120 PRINT '•LOAD". " BLOCK.PKOB.'
130 FOR L = LI TO L2 STEP L3
140 IF L> C THEN 230
150 LET S = 1
160 FOR K = 1 TO C
170 LET T = LTK/F(K)
180 LET S = S + T
190 NEXT K
200 LET P = LtC/(Lt(C + l)/C + F(C)*(l-L/C)*S)
210 PRINT L. P
220 NEXT L





IF(LOAD.GT.RC) GO TO 60
and replace statement 45 and the next by
45 PD = (LOAD'*C). (LOAD**(C +l)/RC-FCTRL(C>*< l.-LOAD/RO'S)
WRlTEie] 50) LOAD. PD
b. Required Operational Assumptions
The use cf Telephone Traffic Theory seems to be
an ideal approach fcr analyzing the complexities of deter-
mining delay times in tactical communications systems.
Several assumptions are required in order to use queue anal-
ysis techniques. One assumption is that if a subscriber
receives a busy signal, then he will hang up and continue to
redial until connected to his distant end. This assumption
allows the queue discipline to be one of "blocked calls
held" instead of "blocked calls lost". This step is
justified by the studies of J. Riordan and R. Silkerson
which resulted in numerous publications in the Bell System
Technical Journal. The most significant is an article by
Riordan in which he contrasts the Erlang C queue with random
service queue. In determining delay times for random order













Figure 3.8 Priority vs. Non-Priority Queues
approximately the sane as for an ordered FIFO discipline.
This is remarkable and convenient since the E (delay time)
for randcm crder of service is not "closed form " solvable
tut FIFO service is solvable [Eef. 8] and [Ref. 9]. Petr
Eeckmann states that:
Randcm order of service in telephone traffic occurs when
subscribers hold their own calls by constantly probing a
busy facility (outside lines serving their extensions,
an engaged number, long distance trunks. etc.). The
subscriber whose attempt comes first just after a line
has become available is so favored only by chance. More
important, modern telephone equipment includes switching
systems wnere contrcl equipment xor setting up paths is
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common to several switching devices; and this control
equipment handles delayed calls in random order.
[fief: 10]
Another inportant assumption concerns the inde-
pendence of interarrival times and message lengths at
queues. A recognized difficulty arises whenever networks of
(tandem) queues are analyzed. This difficulty rests with the
assignment of a delay to each message. This assignment gives
rise to a dependency hetween the interarrival times and the
lengths of adjacent messages as they flow from one queue to
the next gueue. One can attempt to satisfy this difficulty
by refering back to the original G3 message generator
discussed previously (see Figure 3.5). His messages are
assumed to be Foisscn arrivals even though his message
interarrival times and lengths are indeed dependent. The
Foisscn assumption is valid because the collective interar-
rival times and length of messages generated by the entire
population of subscribers exhibited an independence, i.e.
the message lengths generated by the G3 at Corps are
completely independent of the arrival times of messages
generated by the G1 at Division or the S2 at the ADA
Eattalion, etc.
.
Carrying this reasoning forward to analyzing the
internal, nodal gueue to nodal gueue network, one can also
make this independence assumption. There are from 12 to 96
channels transmitting or receiving messages from one node.
The multiplicity of circuits in and out of each node consid-
erably reduces the dependency between interarrival times and
message length of the consecutive messages as they enter
subsequent queues within the network. [Ref. 11]
Leonard Kleinrock, a noted TTT theorists, states
the Independence Assuiiption as follows:
Each time a message is received at a node, a new length
"v" is chosen tor this message from the following
probability density function in Equation 3.3 .
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-Xv < 3 - 3 >
?iv)= Xe
X= ARRIVAL RATE
It is clear that this assumption does not correspond to
the actual situaticr. in any practical communication Let.
Nevertheless, its mathematical consequences result in a
model which accurately describes the behavior of the
message delay in many real nets.
He validates this assumption through simulation in [Ref. 11
PP 50 - 56]. This eguation is imbedded in the theory of the
Recursive equations and is net a computational requirement
of this submodule.
The bottca line is that for a large number of
calls within the overall system and the above assumptions,
it is possible to analyze a random order of service problem
such as a subscriber continuously rediailing if he gets a
busy signal using TIT, and in particular using calls held
service. We can analyze a tandem queue situation by locking
at each codal queue individually.
3y decomposing the arrivals (allowable by the
Poisscn Assumption) into a number of branches that can be
analyzed as single server queues (see Figure 3.9), it is
possible to make maximum use of the work accomplished by
Cobham, Ehite, and Christie. Additional criteria for this
queue model are that there are a total of P different prece-
dence classes. The messages from each precedence class
arrive in a Poisson stream at a rate of (_A.p) * each message
_L
from class ? has an exponential service time with mean (jjip) .
The discipline considered in this model is the
fixed prior ity system with preemption. If a message of
lower priority is preempted by a higher priority then it
"resumes" from the pcint of interrupt to complete the lower
priority message once the higher priority has been completed
[Ref. 11 pp. 73-74]. The assigned priority remains fixed in













Figure 3.9 Decomposition of Arrivals
military telephones systems. On the contrary military
priorities are fixed into Flash Override, Flash, Immediate,
Priority, and Routine precedence levels. Any queued Flash
has a higher priority than any queued Immediate regardless
of the message entry time into the system. If the Immediate
caller is preempted then the caller would redial his call,
get a completed circuit if a channel was free, and continue
with his conversation.
The equations that are used are defined recur-
sively as follows in Table XIII . An important concept that
effects the arrival rate is the determination of tne Busy
Hour. For the busy hour to be more realistic each func-
tional area would need to designate the percentage of
traffic sent and received over each hour of a twenty-four
hour period. This is possitle, however, not discussed in
this thesis. The busy hour slice is 15 5? of COMSE traffic
and represents the communications system peak load hour




c. Procedure For Determining Mean Delay Times
1. Determine the busy hoar traffic by taking 15$ of
total traffic over the link being analyzed.
2. Determine (A,) froAessages transitting link (.ie
messagestraisitting per busy hr / link capacity)
.
3. Determine average service times by precedence then
I UA = 1/ (service time)
4. Ose recursive equation to determine average delay,
D (ip) , for each precedence level for that link.
5. Examine route ch csen for BF traffic. Sum the
average delays for particular precedence across all
transitted links, (S) = $\4| D|p , I=LINKS OF ROUTE
6. Draw random variable from EXP (S) , that is actual





_Dp- DelayTime for the P+h Precedence Level
P
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Figure 3. 1 Tandem Queue
If the BF Artillery was making a flash override
call to EF Intelligence the routing in this example would be
(Phone 1-11-01-02-Phcne 2). To calculate the expected delay
time for phone tc phcne connect just sum the expected delay
times for each link as determined above and listed in Table
XV . If only one call is being simulated then make a random
draw using Exponential with mean 2.28 seconds. If several





Example Flash Override Delay Times
Phcne 1-11 1. 00 sec
1 1-01 . 18 sec
01-02 . 10 sec
02-Phcne 2 1.00 sec




IV. COUHDNICMIONS GENERALIZED VALUE SYSTEM
A. INTECEUCTIOH
The Air-Land Interdiction Model will have an overall
Value System. The discussion that is to follow concerns the
Communications Generalized Value System (CGVS) , a separate
entity, cot to be confused with other combat functional area
Value Systems or the overall Air-Land Value System. The
CGVS provides the means of determining the utility of each
component of the communications architecture in both the
static and dynamic states. The CGVS (see Figure 2.1) will
be able tc provide tc other submodules the quantitative and
qualitative information necessary for planning future
augmentations or reductions of currently deployed assets, or
for prioritizing and allocating resources to restore
degraded assets.
The CGVS submodule, analogously speaking, is the sensory
inputs of the nervous system of communications. The CGVS
provides numbers to the brain so decisions can be made.
Each communication link derives value from how efficiently
each message level of urgency (precedence) is handled, and
that links role withir the coDtext of the entire communica-
tions architecture. The intent of the CGVS is to measure
only marginal traffic created by BIF because the ALIM is
interested cnly in Air-Land Interdiction units. The model
has the capability to measure background traffic value if
required. Every message is destined for a certain part of
the system body; the addressing and urgency decide which
artery the message flows. Unlike the human body, this
message can be stored or rerouted if a part of the system is
temporarily incapacitated. This information flow is
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accomplished as trarsparen tly as possible to the message
sender or receiver. The value of each communication link is
directly determined by the users through the messages they
send. Based on the communications required by the users, the
communications planning staff literally builds from the
ground up the communications to support the requirements.
All the retwork building or rebuilding decision logic find
their justification in the CGVS. Usage of generic systems
or allocations of additional resources of any type are
directly determined using data from the CGVS. There are no
models which currently utilize any sort of CGVS to make
decisions of high resolution for communication play. The
CGVS is essential tc credible examining cf comparative
decision making in a high resolution environment.
E. CGVS CONCEPT
The CGVS data used for designing and maintaining commu-
nications support is broken down into areas based on time
and event sequencing; the pre-combat static phase and the
combat dynamic phase. Standing operations orders, based
upon historical deployment of systems over years of exercise
play, exist for deployment of communications systems.
Planning staffs have created OPLANS based upon potential
tactical scenarios and expected potential value of communi-
cation links to mission accomplishment. The planners know
generally who must be supported, however the unit locations
and vclume of traffic vary considerably based upon indi-
vidual unit's time sequenced contribution to the ongoing
battle. For example, a high priority communications link
ties Theater Main tc Corps Main from the start of the war.
One might assume that this link would have tremendous
dynamic value because this link ties a resource allocater to
a heavy resource user while in the midst of mortal combat.
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Quite to the contrary, Corps Main cares little atcut its
ability to talk to higher headquarters in the early stages.
Corps Main is ccncerned with the battle situation for the
first few days and is capable of fighting at this time rela-
tively unsupported by Theater. The link maintains a high
static value. As the days wear on, this link obviously
becomes much more critical to Corps for allocation of
replenishment resources from Theater, i.e. the link attains
a high dynamic value with time.
What is the Value of this link? This is a difficult
concept to grasp because the value changes over time and
event occurrences. What is the value of alternative routes
to this link? Should reconstitution of this link take place
when degradation occurs? When is the value of this link so
high that Eed Forces must attempt interdiction? Hew do we
guantify this value ever time? These research questions must
be resolvable by analysis of the CGV5 output. What stands
out most at this point is that the initially deployed
network links have a potential value based on historical
usage and as the battle progresses, the link values increase
or decrease in value over time based on user demand
generation and the success of enemy interdiction efforts.
Picture a pipeline through which passes general communi-
cation traffic having relatively small values. If this
traffic is delayed for a period of time the value does not
deteriorate or reduce the war fighting capability. Impose on
this link traffic of a newly arrived unit called the All
Source Anal ysi s Center which has traffic for the Corps TOC
(Figure U. 1)
.
When entities of high value are placed on this link the
message traffic and corresponding message value jumps enor-
mously. Should this link be overloaded or incapacitated, the
alternate routing for this needline increases in value











Figure 4.1 ASAC to CORPS TOC Needline Routing
increase because the more "metal", the lower circuit
availability, and higher the probability of delay.
Congestion or overloading on these links may on occasion
result in the devaluing the time sensitive messages. The
devaluation may be to the point where the decision to still
attack a certain target may be reversed in favor of a now
more valuable target. (Figure 4.2)
The new Communications Support Requirements Database 7
will provide guidance as to the comparative value that each
functional area message possesses if it were delivered in
real time. Examine Table VIII . This Table reveals data
elements Six (Speed of Service and Perishability of
Information) and Seven (Cost of Failure - critical, indis-
pensatle, essential, etc.) . Element Seven could give us the
initial value8 (Vi) for Figure 4.2 . Element Six could give
us the Exponential parameter needed to degrade the value of
the message over time thereby giving us the final value.
This Value Process is feasible, but it remains to be seen if
the CCMSR database can gain the support needed to update and
revalidate these data elements.
7 Ihis database was discussed in the Communications
Degradation Submcdule and further study should be conducted
in this area.
mine
8 Qsing MADMAN (Appendix C). , weighting techniques















Figure 4.2 Value Degradation Over Time
The communication complexity in a war environment natu-
rally generates mary questions. The CGVS coupled with
message vector audit trails will help answer them. But how
is this elusive value found? Intuition suggests that
message value should be calculated in the Communications
Module by aggregating products of the number of messages
times an urgency level (precedence) multiplier for each
message ever the link. However, this procedure , although
simple ir. design, reflects the point of view of the communi-
cations officer and not the subscriber. An amazing amount of
"precedence creep'1 occurs when a subscriber needs to pass
information quickly tut is not authorized because of the
requirements of each precedence level. On a fast moving,
dynamic battlefield, information about when and where to
resupply beans and bullets can be just as important as where
to conduct an air strike in winning a battle. A value
system that would lend itself to designing a communication
network that minimizes delay times for all precedence levels
is far mere responsive to the subscriber than just saving a
link is of such and such a value because 3000 routine
messages passed through it in the last hour and were all
delivered within the required 24 hour period. This section
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will describe a systeir that will reward and punish networks
based on tiire delay and not on minimum precedence aspiration
levels. This value will become a key input parameter to the
Reroute Submodule, the Reconstitution Submodule, the Network
Grid ard the audit trail of the Interdiction Model as a
whole.
1 . Sta tic Value Leter m ination
Suppose general mobilization follows a buildup to
East-West tensions along the German border. According to
most scenarios the first deploying organizations are the
tactical Signal units supporting the Corps and Theater
Communications Zone (COMMZ) . The intercommunications grids
required by wartime CELANS are set up and functionally oper-
ative within three days. There are, as yet, few if any users
of the tactical network. Most combat, and combat support
units are preparing for deployment or waiting for political
approval to deploy from their base Kasernes. They are still
using the fixed communications supplied by the U.S. Army
Communications Command or the Bundespost Phone System.
At this point in time, the tactical communications
system has a potential value based upon the generic systems
which have been deployed to support potential users.
Although the communication grid has been designed symmetri-
cally to reduce its susceptibility to enemy collection
efforts, there are enough asymmetries to suggest that some
nodes are more important than others. Certain types of
radios are indicative of the importance of the users they
support and of the importance of the internodal links to the
success of the overall communication network. The potential
value of these links and nodes is static because no users
have been tied into the network.
The method used to derive the utility values of each
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a variation of the MAEMAN Algorithm discussed in Appendix C.
The basic unit of communication hardware and therefore plan-
ning is the circuit. The MADMAN Methodology provides a
means to derive a single aggregated measure of effectiveness
(MOE) , a utility value, from various individual attributes
for the circuit. Seme of the attributes considered by the
experts are equipment survivability/ cost, mission essen-
tialness, reliability, and capacity (see Table XXIV for
details). The following procedure outlines the MADMAN input
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These attritutes and ethers are weighted in pairwise compar-
isons. The potential role value or conditional value of
circuits such as for nuclear release may in this manner be
included as an attribute which considers "Potential Value".
Gnce the S(j) f s, the scaled values in Table XVII , have been
obtained then multiply the values by 1000 to derive more
aesthetic utility values. As seen in Figure 4.3, by summing
the individual values of the equipment employed and "on
site" tackup we can determine the static value of signal
nodes prior to any traffic being passed.
Area NODE
Area NODE











VALUE =£x; . i= COMPONENTS
COMMAND NODE = 2464 AREA NODE=5407
Figure 4.3 Static Value Example
2- Dynamic Value Determination
As the combat forces assume their battle positions
and users begin to place demands on the communications
75

system, the value cf links shift from the static value of
hardware to a dynamic value based upon the actual message
flow. Before describing the dynamic value system, we give a
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Figure 4.4 Hessage Scenario
From Figure 4.4 we see that a phone number is punched into a
digital telephone at the origin. This phone has a circuit
path tc the nearest circuit switch at Node 2. At Node 2,
the call is demodulated and passed through a patch panel to
the circuit switch. The call is routed automatically to Link
A or E depending on circuit availability between nodes 2 and
4. The process is repeated until it reaches node 4 which
has a circuit to the FDC. Given that the circuit is avail-
able, the whole process to include the dialing and imme-
diate receiver pickup takes 7-15 seconds. The circuit is now
complete and the user sends his message.
The value of this phone conversation is a function
of the value placed upon it by the originator according to
command guidance and the time it takes to turn the targeting
information into fire allocation information. The ability
to destroy a particular target by such and such a time has
more value now than if the target is attacked 20 minutes
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later, especially if the target has moved from its known
location. The commurication network is responsible for only
a portion of this writer to reader time, the communications
"expected delay time " that is maintained in the message
vector.
A perfectly functioning communications system should
result in no lost value to this target information. However
time delays or failure to achieve required urgency prece-
dence levels during the passage of this information rot only
reduces the value of this message but also points out short-
comings in the communication system that must be repaired




where Wjd is the weighted multiplier determined by 3ADHAN
expert opinion.
Dp is the mean delay time for each precedence level over
that link.
Hp_ is the number of messages for each precedence over that
link.
To aggregate these prcducts for all messages over each link




Its would be relatively easy to put counters into
each link tc determine N2 and a time clock parameter to keep
track of the total message time in each message vector to
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Figure 4.5 Hourly Depiction of Link Value Versus Time
The value of each link should be captured at
some preselected time slice, say hourly. Using Equation
4. 1 , it would be possible to graphically represent the value
over time for each link. It would also be possible to
disaggregate the traffic loads into two groups: 1.) COHSE
generated and 2.) BF generated. Using Equation 4.2, it would
be possible to conduct sensitivity analysis by varying (Ct
)
between and 1. This discounts the current background COMSR
generated value and inflates the value of the marginal
traffic. This method has the effect of forcing the submo-
dules that make decisions based upon asset values (e.g.
Seconstitution) to make those decisions in light of the now
highly valued marginal traffic. This method could be a




VALUE=af-%^ + 1 -%*!eif+ ^(static) (4 - 2)
ft -Primary (?« uf fl - /I If crn*+e Rout
C-COMSR fiF- Margtnal Tf-A-fVic
It would also be possible to vary ([jj from 1 to (00) to
conduct sensitivity analysis of the link for future planning
missions or potential unplanned missions.
r. Non Operational Valuation
The value of each non operational link should
also he captured at seme interval, say hourly. To do this,
one would take the links that fail the Availability Monte
Carlo and the downtime that has been randomly drawn
according to the Degradation Chapter. The Routing algorithm
would continue to route traffic over the down links,
however, the traffic would also be routed over the alternate
route. Dsing Equation 4.3 , it would be possible to place a
value en the down link.
VALUE= Oii:SS+ Z^5» + /5(STAT I C)
fl -Primary flout" A - Alternate Rout
C'CoasR BF- Marginal Traffic
where ( Up ) is defined as the expected delay time cf th
alternate route at precedence "p" of the 3F Interdiction
e
traffic. This equation is sensitive to tne added delay time
of the alternate route. If there is not any added delay time
then, obviously, the primary route was not important enough
to place high on the recons titution priority list.
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7- BOLE-BASED DECISION SOB MODULES
A. INTRODUCTION
The Air-Land Interdiction Model, as previously stated,
is a research wargame and as such requires decision making
to be consistent and reproducible. In order to achieve these
lofty goals, the modules must make maximum use of man made
rules and expert opinion to create "automated, closed loop"
decision making algorithms that replace the "man in the
loop". There are four rule based decision submodules in the
CM; cne, Degradation, has already been discussed. The ether
three will be discussed in this chapter. The methodology for
developing each submcdule is outlined in detail in the
"Closed loop Decision Making" section.
E. CIOSED LOOP DECISION MAKING
1 . Sel ecting Comm unic ati on Alternat iyes in a C cmtat
Environmen t
.
The primary objective of this section is to set
forth and analyze the factors that allow a communications
user to decide which cf the available communications assets
to use given that he has information that must be passed
from himself to a distant receiver. The second objective is
to translate these decision factors or attributes into a
simple model.
The problem is to develop an automated Decision
Submcdule that "humanly" selects the communications mode
(voice, record traffic, ETC.) and means (telephone, radio,
ETC.) . The key to the validity of this simulation is whether
or not and to what extent the human thought process is
actually reflected by the algorithm.
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Tc accomplish this, an understanding of tne jot and
skill level of the user and how he makes decisions under the
pressure of combat is required. This section will illus-
trate this process for one user needline. The user will be
the G-3 Operations officer for 7 Corps in Germany. The G-3
was chosen for study because he is a Combat Arms Officer in
a high pressure job and has a wide array of communications
available tc pass messages. It is important to note that the
concentration of this submodule should be with the processes
of real combat and net the minutia of realism. The model
must be robust encugh to satisfy the communications
selection decision of all users [Ref. 12].
a. Analysis of Decision Maker
A general model describing how the G3 Operations
selects communication means can be seen in Figure 5.1
[Ref. 13 ]. The success or failure of the OS Corps may very
well rest en how well the G3 Ops planning staff directs the
subordinate units to accomplish the Corp's flexible defense
operations. An implicit requirement of this superior to
subordinate directing is that at least one means of
communication must be available. [Ref. 14]
The high intensity of the Corp's battle creates
an encrmcus load and stress upon the G3. Other human vari-
ables that icay effect our Decision Maker (DM) are his biolo-
gical cycle, sleep less, recent diet, recent successes or
failures, and concerns for his family and many other vari-
ables [Ref. 15]. The G3 lacks the in depth understanding of
the intercennectivity of the communication system that
supports him. He is concerned with whether or not he ca n
communicate, not how the communications works. His communi-
cation requirements are not always resolved in the most
optimal or efficient manner especially for requirements for
which there are no SOF's, contingency plans, advice of

co-workers, subordinates or communications officers to cffer
solutions. In these respects he is like 99 5E of the other
users of communications on the battlefield. [Ref. 16]
b. Modelling of Decision Making
According to Cohen, March, and Olsen (1972) , the
G3 organization decision making can be characterized by
ambiguity in technology, preferences, and participation. See
Figure 5.1 [Ref. 13].
Tacttcal Communications Decfstons Under


































Figure 5.1 Tactical Communications Decision making
Ambic[uit.y of Technology describes an organiza-
tion's ignorance as to the options that are available to its
DM's and the linkages between these alternatives and their
likely consequences or outcomes. This difficulty is often
aggravated by inexperience in particular roles, because all




Mkia^ii^ cf Preference contribute to the orga-
nized anarchy/ by interfering with rankings of alternatives
and their outcomes. Superior preferences in military
operations are likely to be heterogeneous in the extreme.
Ambiguities of Participati on are the result of
participants who are part time, or shift their energies
among decision situations within the organization, or
across boundaries. In military operations , fluidity of
participation has two important causes: battle losses of key
specialists or forces, and communication limitations that
effectively isolate potential participation from decisions.
[fief. 13]
In reference to Figure 5.1 and Table XVIII, the
Corps Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) and communication
contingency plans require certain types, urgency levels,
message lengths, or classification levels of messages to be
transmitted over certain means [ Ref . 14 and 16]. When
several allowable means exist that appear to satisfy the
requirement then a cc-workers or subordinates 5 recommenda-
tion as to which means he had success with is generally
implemented. The major dilemma occurs when it appears there
are no SCP's, plans, or recommendations to rely upon. In
these cases the G3 must match his unmatched communications
requirement problems with any solution (communication
means) , that appear to have the highest probability of
satisfjing. When the user compares his alternative means in
order to decide which to use, we have an example of Hulti
Attribute Decision Making (see Figure 5.2). It is important
to rememter that autcaating DM results in far more consis-
tent decisions being made; therefore to truly simulate the
DM a mild amount of inconsistency must be input. This is
accomplished by rigorously incorporating expert human
opinion cf non-communications oriented personnel (ie. Ccmrat
Arms Officers) into MADMAN making sure to avoid the expert
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opinion of communications personnel. MADMAN actually
calculates the level of inconsistency for the experts'
opinicEs. [Eef- 12]- and [Ref. 17]
r~
Multt -Attribute Decision








__Pres»ure of the Moment
of Decisionmaker
i i
Typ? •*?ssi r,5t;c'tTop/' r!'fo /ccorclnstTon
Figure 5.2 Hulti Attribute Decision Making
In MADMAN there is usually a countably small
number cf predetermined communications modes and means
alternatives. The alternatives have associated with them
several common attributes. A cost and benefit comparison of
the attributes can be made and a final decision on which
means to use can be reached. The decision as tc which
alternative to select is made with the help of pairwise
attribute comparisons. The comparisons may involved explicit
or implicit "expert opinion" tradeoffs. MADMAN is in short a
decision aid to help maximize satisfaction with respect to
more than one attribute.
MADMAN has many military applications, such as
the evaluation and selection of personnel, strategy, weapon
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systens, policy, facility locations, contracts; the evalua-
tion cf effectiveness; and expert judgement or group partic-
ipation and analysis for selection, strategy, policy, etc..
Appendix C has a detailed explanation of MADMAN and a
computer program developed by Marceilo of MADMAN, as well as
a practical example.
As a manager of scarce resources the G3 seiri-
consciously appraises the benefits and costs of all his
actions. The depth cf these appraisals depends upon the
significance of the decision tc be made. The G3 will seek to
minimize the delay time of sending a message to the Air
Defense Battalion S3 while attempting to minimize the rela-
tive costs of tying up the vital communications means being
allocated to the communications problem. The data elements
or attributes which link the decision maker to his communi-
cation selection are Urgency Required, Type Message, Message
length, Classif icaticn, Expected Delay Time of the "(I-1)th M
message, and the communications alternatives available
between the originator and the receiver. [Ref. 18] and
[Ref. 19]
2 • Bes ult s and D iscussion of Automated "Closed locp"
Decisi on Model
The SOP and contingency plans are expected to
predetermine solutions for most of the communications
requirements. The remaining communications requirements
will be solved using expert opinion to weight or scale the
multiattribute data elements (listed under Subjective Filter
in Table XVIII) in crder to determine which communication
alternatives would be selected.
In examining the results of the two runs made using
the algorithm model in figures 5.1 and 5.2, it can be seen
that autcmated DM has successfully been accomplished. In
Table XVIII, the Objective Filter Data Elements give a
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precise solution because the technical parameters matched
the technical parameters of the SOP alternative. Intuition
and the experience cf the author confirm the selection as
being correct; a five page, type written, classified, opera-
tions order would be transmitted using common user teletype
circuits or Optical Character Recognition Equipment.
For ease of identification each user's communica-
tions is classified fcy a Type Communications Package, the
type is strictly dependent upon the TO&E equipment and
Common User System support authorized.
In Table XX the technical parameters could net be
objectively filtered to provide an SOP solution. This
Acticc Type message is by SOP transmitted using S/C Voice
radio or Teletype; however, neither would satisfy the FLASH
OVERRIDE urgency. The unsecure FM voice radio could not
satisfy the urgency because time consuming manual encryption
would have teen required and the lance BDE was out of range.
All fcur alternatives could have satisfied classifications.
All fcur could have satisfied message length although
preparatory typing would have delayed transmission.
Subjective filter elements were, therefore, implemented
using expert opinion input into the MADMAN Program for multi
attribute decision making (see Table XIX). [Ref. 17] Secure
Telephone had the shortest expected delay time, lowest ccst
and highest benefit, and cculd motivate the receiver tc the
urgency cf this information through the use of direct voice
intonations and pitch.
The procedure outlined in Table XIX suggests seme
MADMAN input requirements that must be based upon C2 experts
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It is fascinating and encouraging to note the amount
of research which is being accomplished in the arena of
automated decision aaking. In referencing the model
depicted in Figure 5.1, it can be seen that multi attribute
decision making can be a source of pre-determined solu-
tions waiting for what had originally been an unmatched
problem. Although definitive progress is being made, we are
lagging well behind the Soviets in this field of automated
"Cybernetics".
C. DSEB TO USER ROOTING DECISION
The Dser to User Decision Submodule (UDDS) as seen in
Figure II, has three decisions to make. The Select Mode and
Select Means decisions are rule-based decisions of expert
players and SOP's. The Routing decision is based on network
theory decision algorithm Minimum Spanning Tree.
The Select Mode decision draws upon the MTO&E database
to determine the feasible modes available to both the origi-
nator (0) and the receiver (R) . Once the communications
modes are presented then the ur.genc2 an(^ classification are
considered to determine the optimal mode. If for some reason
the primary selected mode is net available then the alter-
nate modes are attempted in the order shown in Table XXI The
message vector new has the parameters 0, R, , C, I, Mode
(MD) . *
The message vector now moves to the Select Means deci-
sion. Select Means draws upon the dedicated, organic commu-
nications available to (MTC&2) and the inorganic
communications provided by the Signal Corps or Host Nation.
The Means are selected by determining the feasible and then
9 These parameters are explained in detail in the Message





•LI ELLm^zZ mode fails then cjo to alternate.
£liJ5ilII Voice Rec Trf Data Fax Mess
1st Alt Rectrf Fax RecTrf Mess RecTrf
2nd Alt Fax Mess Voice Voice Fax
3rd Alt Mess Voice Mess
the optimal Means available between and R based upon U, C,
MD selected, SOP's, aid MADMAN.
The message vector progresses to the Select Route deci-
sion. The Select Route decision uses the Minimum Scanning
Tree Algorithm to select the path that minimizes the number
of nodes transitted. Both primary route availability and
the secondary route and availability are added to the
message vector and forwarded to the Availability Monte
Carlo.
D. REROUTE SUBMODOLE
The purpose of this submodule is to help answer the
questions of what happens to the message vector if the crit-
ical path being transitted becomes impassable. Although the
algorithi is still in its infancy, topics of importance and
parameters are discussed in soire detail. The requirement to
rerout this message traffic stems from the reduced ability
of a pcrticn of the communication network to support the
user in a timely manner. Based upon the availabilities,




Figure 5.3 Minimum Spanning Tree Example
simulator. If the Mcnte Carlo failed for an 85% available
systen: then the system would be down for (1-.85) x 24 hours
= 3.6 hours = ( A ) . An Exponential draw with mean 3.6 would
he made to determine the actual down time and all sub-modules
would b€ updated as seen in Figure 2.1 . The goal of
Rerouting is to provide an alternate critical path which is
still capable of satisfying the urgency precedence level and
classification required for the message.
The Reroute Decision response is extremely dependent
upon the mode and the means selected and the extent of
degradation inflicted upon the network. Since the logic of
Reroute varies with whether the means are single or multi-
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1 • Single Channel
The single channel means of communication is gener-
ally a radio dedicated or sole owned by its user. It can be
either a Eush-to-Talk voice, data, or teletype optimized
transceiver. These types of radios are used primarily while
mobile. They are line of sight and are sensitive tc ECM
especially when used for over two minutes at a time. We
assume that if a user attempts to use a net radio and finds
the net (frequency) congested with other users, he will
continue to attempt tc use this means while fully realizing
that he must wait tc get his turn on the frequency. If
however, the frequency is being successfully jammed (R F
Interdiction) then the user has several choices. If the
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radio is his only means of communication, then he may
continue to try to break through the jamming or he can
change tc an alternate frequency. Net control is difficult
under jamming conditions. The net control station attempts
to inform ether users to change frequency to the pre-
established alternate. If it is impossible to reestablish
the net then he may just send a messenger. If this radic net
is net the only means available then the user will likely
decide to change to a means that is less susceptible to
jamming and direction finding.
2 - Multichannel
Multichannel means of communications are generally
far more rcbust in an ECM environment then single channel
radios. Whether the multichannel radios are line of sight or
over the horizon, whether they are dedicated as in the the
Air Defense arena , or common user as provided by the Signal
Corps, the radios are integrated into a network grid which
provides redundant paths between nodes. At the nodes are
switches which either automatically or manually reroute
traffic frcm nonavailable links to available links. The
additional time of reroute is usually not critical tc the
user unless the alternate route has been congested. Only if
it appears that the alternate link will not satisfy the
urgency precedence levels required will the user think of
selecting another means of cemmunica tion . An example is
referred to in Table XXIII .
If the message vector was given the Microwave route
and this failed at tie the Monte Carlo, the alternate route
of AM Single Side Band would then be Monte Carlced ; if it
passed then the accumulated time would be 25 seconds fcr the


































* Selection based on fewest number o:
(highest availability)
nodes
If an alternative route for multichannel or an
alternative means for single channel was decided upon then
the appropriate availability would again be Monte Carloed
with delay time added. An important product of the Rercut
Module is the CGVS evaluation cf non-operational links. The
CGVS determines the lost value of messages over down links
and reports this to the Eeconstitution Submodule. This lest
value is critical tc the resource allocation decision in
restoring down links.
E. EECCHSTITUTIOH SUEHODULE
The purpose of this submodule is to correct deficiencies
of the communications system in supporting its users.
Available and reliable communication is a critical neces-
sity. This submodule is important to the overall
Communications Module, however, the algorithm is still in
its very early stages. Crucial issues and parameters are




If communications is lost within any important parr of
the network, allocation decisions must be made by the system
planners and controllers to reconstitute stricken areas. The
Eeconstitution Module (EM) , depicted in Figure 2.1, will
receive the type degradation and the value of the lick up to
the current point in time. The module will internally allo-
cate resources to correct the source of degradation and
return to the communication degradation module the expected
time to restoration of link capability and the upgraded
availability. The Eeconstitution submodule will also notify
the Eercuting Submodule as to how long it will have to
reroute traffic around the degraded link.
The EM will lock at the severity of the damage and
assign a priority for reconstitution. It will decide tased
on availability and location of reconstitution equipment and
the cause of degradation if and when the link will be
available for further use.
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71. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The Corps Communications Module described in this thesis
uses a variety of academic and real world phenomenon to
simulate the flow cf communications between battlefield
users and to evaluate communications assets' worth.
Academically, the CM uses the properties developed by A.K.
Erlang's Telephone Traffic Theory and related works to
establish the need for and the use of ( A ) , the message
arrival rate, and ( fJ. ) , the message service rate. If
traffic summaries (A' s/^' s ) are available for each arc
(link) then blocking probabilities and mean delay times may
he derived. Communications assets values are a function of
these delay times encountered over the links. Real world
phenomenon such as environmental occurrences, Red Porce
interdiction, and 31ue Force congestion drastically effect
the links that are available to pass message traffic. These
degradation forms are critical players in a communications
simulation and are discussed in detail. The Poisscn princi-
ples of Decompositicr and Superposition allow for easy
handling of diverted traffic loads (additivity of A_' s ) and
in analyzing multiserver queues in a simple fashion.
The Corps Communications Module also develops a myriad
of decision making techniques to allocate resources to areas
in need. The Communication Generalized Value System provides
a methcdclogy for determining hardware asset value which in
turn can he used for allocation of resources that maintain
communications. MADMAN provides a methodology and a means to
make decisions that are not backed up by hard numrers;
MADMAN is the "fuzzy" area decision making tool. MADMAN can
ke extensively used for developing pre-de termined solutions
to prcriems that have not yet occurred; in other words with
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the help of expert opinion, MAEHAN can be used to "close the
loop" on simulating man made decisions in an automated
"man-less" algorithm. Standing Operating Procedures are the
most ccmnion pre-determined source of solutions to problems
and should be used as the rule rather than the exception.
SOP's provide decision alternatives in the "well structured
and defined" areas.
In conclusion, the CM submodules are presented at
various levels of mature development. These algorithms do
provide an excellent start point for a programmer to further
develop the CM into a working module. The analysis of
derived CGVS values and the message vector audit trails can
shed light into the previously foreboding research guestion
areas of communications systems supporting functional areas
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Figure A. 2 Resolution Level One (continued)
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Figure A. 3 Resolution Level Two
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Figure A- 4 Resolution Level Two (continued)
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Figure A. 5 Resolution Level Three
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Figure A. 6 Resolution level Three (continued)
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INTEGEP SNCJl), ENC31), VL: , AFC(3e>, SCHElL<3fc), NODECte)
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K=EN(KINARC> READ (4, 9) AKSVEE
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G10SSABY OF TEEMS AND ACRONYMS
A. TEEMS
A working understanding of the entities and attributes
of the communications network is essential to the programmer
and will be described in detail in the following appendix .
Entity. . . An end item or piece of hardware that possesses
attributes which characterize the communications link.
Example: An AN/TEC 138 is a line of sight , multichannel
radio which ties two Corps Area Signal nodes together. The
arc or airwaves between the two nodes carry secure voice,
record traffic ar.d data. Attribu te s. . . A characteristic
such as reliability , comm security, freguency, ETC. are key
to describing entities such as links and link hardware.
Cable. . . Int rasite carle is the 2b pair cable strung
between the communications vans within a signal node.
Significant power losses occur alonj this cable therefore
the iraximum length is 1500 feet, this restriction liaits
the dispersion of ccmia vans, thereby increasing vainer-
ability to air and artillery and ECiJ interdiction efforts.
ii!be_i:ji;te cab le or ECM (CX1 1230) provides multichannel
access tc large users within a 40 mile radius. Vulnerability
to interdiction is very small. Intersite cable systems are
often used to separate Command Signal nodes from the
headguarters they are supporticg.
Data. . . Message information passed between I/O
devices and computers, or computer to computer. It is
capable of extremely fast transfer of information. Circuits
supporting data systems must be specially conditioned or
optimized for data transmission. Voice circuits perform
poorly vihen attempting to pass data traffic.
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RiH££ticn Finding. . . An ECU capability which locates
electronic emission sources. It is a passive collector and
therefore it is very difficult to detect. They are the eyes
for jammers, air, and artillery interdiction fires. The
threat may he reduced by the prudent use of emission terrain
masking, use of lower power settings, short messages ETC.
Airborne direction finders must fly parallel to the FEEA at
slow speeds and therefore are vulnerable to ground or air
attack.
.Expected Delay. Time. . . The expected value or mean
delay time a message experiences as a result of net
congestion, terminal congestion, enemy interdiction efforts,
or normal transit tine. This is the key parameter which the
commo value system and therefore the entire commo network
asset value is judged.
facsimile. . . Message transmission device which is
capable of actually passing true copies of hand written
notes, maps, pictures , ETC. .
Fie^ugP cy * • • Wavelength to which radios are tuned to
transmit and receive electronic messages. Airwaves
"wavelength" vary in vulnerability with changes in
atmospheric conditions, jam-ability, maximum distance
emissions can be detected, ETC..
Jamming. . . An EC M capability which put noise on
communications links and reduces those links reliability.
Jammers are frequency, directional, and power output depen-
dent and are highly vulnerable to interdiction because of
their unique electronic signature.
isilL§ 2l Sight. . . (ICS) Attribute required because
radio waves bend very little around blocking terrain or
buildings.
link. . . Also referred to as an arc or a branch of a
communication network. They tie nodal switching points and
users together. SEE: en tit y , attribute. Message. . . A
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discrete block of information passed from the initiator to
the receiver, it may have many attributes most important of
which are its urgency and classification.
The load or subscriber demand is defined as the average
number of calls offered times the average call duration .
Node. . . A junction point in a communications network.
Access to and from the network may be gained at the node.
Example: the Corps Area Signal nodes provides switching
facilities for messages going througn the node as well as
input and output facilities for terminal users.
Nonsecure. . . Message information passed in the clear
or unencrypted mode. By 19 86 it will be found only at Armor
and Infantry company and platoon nets. Manual encryption of
sensitive information will still be possible at this level.
Cver the Horizon . . . (OTH) Attribute of type radio
that use the troposphere, ionosphere, or satellites to
reflect radio waves ever the radios' horizon. The OTH radios
give the user a "skip echelon" capability to bypass damaged
or destroyed commo systems. OTH still requires a clear
window along the directed azimuth of the system tut
vulnerability is reduced because CTH radios do
QQ£L-Li%l of service is characterized by the probability
that a call offered during the typical busy hour will be
blocked .
J3.§dic. • • An electronic means of passing messages from
one user to another. Radios have either single channel or
multichannel capability depending upon what the user demand
requires tc support his needs. The range of propagation
varies dependent upen power output, terrain, frequency,
friendly interference and enemy interdiction.
Record Traffic. . . Electronic passage of information
which produces hard copy record of message. Example:
Teletype or facsimile. Record traffic is capable of trans-
mission speeds faster than voice but slower than data.
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Record traffic is generally better in a high ECM environment
than voice because information is binary pulsed rather than
voice nodulated (frequency or amplitude modulation)
requiring less transmit time, less exposure to possible DP.
Rejecting a call means giving the subscriber a busy
signal , even if the number he is calling is not busy .
Alternatively , the call is rerouted via seme other trunk ,
or it is held until a line becomes available and thus
suffers a delay . In none of these three cases does the
exchange handle the call immediately , ana regardless of its
future fate the call is said to be blocked . It is actually
the exchange that is blocked , unable to let the traffic
flow through it; the calls are lost to the exchange if
rejected or rerouted , and held if delayed , but bcth lest
and held calls are often denoted by the common nameof
blocked calls .
Switch. . . Either circuit (telephone) or message
(Record Traffic) switches. Switches are responsible for
routing , rerouting, storing and frowarding of messages.
The switch routing logic determines orientation or direction
of traffic and flow capacity of the node. It limits the
traffic directed down any on link based upon the link flow
capacity.
2S£liH§l Eq uipment. . . Actual hardware employed by the
user to access the ccirmo network. Example: telephone, visual
display, optical character reader, facsimile, teletypewriter
, ETC. .
Voice. . . Message traffic employing the voice
frequencies of 0-300C hertz such as a single channel voice







A2. .. alternate route availability
AD. . . Air Defense
ALIM. .. Air-Land Interdiction Model
Ao. . . Cp erational Availability
A3C...Area Signal Center
EF. . . Elue Force
EFI...Biue Force Interdiction
C3I. . •Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
CCMC. . .Circuit Connect Monte Carlo
CGVS. . .Communications Generalized Value System
CM... Corps Communications Module
C0MIN1. . .Communications Intelligence
COMMZ . . . Comzunications Zone
COMSE . . .Communic ations Support Requirements Database
D...mean delay time
EAD. . .Echelon Above Division
ECM. . .Electronic Countermea sures
ECCM . ..Electronic Counter- counter measures
EMP. . .Electro- magnetic Pulse
FZBA. .. Forward Edge cf Battle Area
FLCT. . .Forward Line cf Troops
110

H/P...Hawk cr Patriot Air Defense Unit
INTACS. . .Integrated Tactical Communications System
LOS. . .Line of Sight
MADMAN. . .Hulti Attritute Decision Making Algorithm
MC. . . Monte Carlo
M/C. . .Multi-channel
MD Mod€S
MN. . . Means
MTBF...Mean Time between Failure
MTTE...Mean Time to Eepair
Non-op. . . Non-opera ticnal
C. . . Originator
Cp. . .Operational
CESA ... Operations Eesearch and Systems Analysis
E. . . Eeceiver
EDF...Eadio Direction Finding
EEC. . .Eadio Electronic Combat
EF. . . Fed Force
EFI...Eed Force Interdiction
FFIM...Eed Force Interdiction Module
EM. . . Feccnstit ution Submodule
S/C... Single Channel
SOP. . .Standing Operating Order
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T. . . Elapsed Time
TSADCC. . .Training And Doctrine Command
TTT. . .Telephone Traffic Theory
D... urgency or precedence level
UW. . . Unconventional Warfare
V Corps... 5th U.S. Army Corps, located near Fulda Salient
West Gemany
TOSS ... Table of Orgacization and Equipment
lambda (_A_) ...message arrival rate
HO (_/^_) • • -message service rate





ERIEFING 09 HCLTI- ATTRIBUTE DECISION MAKING
MA EM AN
MADM can be used to evaluate the effectiveness and
therefore the utility value that similar mission communica-
tions systems contribute to tne overall communications
network . The following procedure outlines the MADM input
requirements that must be based upon communications and C2
experts opinions .
TABLE XXIV
Multi Attribute Decision Making Evaluation Example
. Define Alternatives .
eg. A 1=sate Hi te ground station
A2 = HF radio
A3 = microwave radio
AU = FM radios
A5 = Mobile Subscriber Terminal
. Define Attributes
X1 = Channel Capacity
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